Hegel - Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis!
Having just led a tutorial discussion on the Palestinian/Israeli "issue", I have become aware of just how easy it is to articulate the two sides of the "issue" but that to find the Hegelian synthesis has been all but impossible. What chance the real people who have to solve the conflict - that is if they really want to! The essay question for our discussion was: "Account for the failure of Palestinian military strategies in bringing about their stated political objectives during the first and second intifadas". We ranged away from this specific question as the answer is more complex than first seems. Here, for the record, is 1,000 words on the given title...
The Palestinian military strategies in the first (1987) intifada failed because of an inability to take full advantage of a popular uprising that had gained wide-spread international support. In the second (Al-Aqsa) intifada, the primary cause of failure has been an over-emphasis on the use of violence. This has split Palestinian society, making it impossible to maintain the strategic focus required for success. Without the military means required to achieve their political objectives by force, or a willingness to adjust them, there seems little chance of any military strategy succeeding. Furthermore, the in-fighting that has characterized Palestinian politics remains the dominant factor today as the Palestinians face the spectre of civil war.
The 1987 intifada surprised both the Israelis and Palestinians. The cause was essentially a Palestinian frustration with their lot: a quasi-occupation under which normal political, social and economic life was stifled and from which there appeared to be no escape. The intifada started as a popular uprising without specific political objectives and therefore no pre-defined military strategy. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), however, which was worried about being marginalized, quickly joined the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, the Communist Party and Islamic Jihad to form the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), in an attempt to coordinate and benefit from the intifada.[1] The UNLU mantra was, ‘down with occupation; long live Palestine as a free and Arab country’.[2] The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) joined the intifada late but was soon taking a leading role. They maintained that there could be no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad and urged Palestinians to rise up and expel the Jews from Palestine.[3]
Although sparked off by Sharon visiting Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif, the Al-Aqsa intifada resulted from the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit. Camp David was to have been the final peace deal, ending decades of Palestinian-Jewish strife but, with the Jerusalem and refugee issues unresolved, the Summit collapsed. The failure added to the frustration of Palestinians with a peace process which had not gained them an independent state and had not improved the reality of their lives in the occupied territories. The loss of confidence in the ability of the peace process to deliver a permanent agreement on acceptable terms had a dramatic impact on the level of Palestinian support for violence against Israelis, including suicide bombings against civilians. According to the PLO, the political objectives of the Al-Aqsa intifada were; the return of refugees; the ending of occupation; the gaining of independence and sovereignty; and establishment of Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem. In reality, the Palestinians had not altered their basic position they had held since 1993; a two-state solution, with a non-militarized Palestinian state along 1967 borders and a pragmatic solution to the refugee problem.[4] Palestinian political objectives, whilst fragmented, were not vastly different between the two intifadas i.e. the destruction of Israel for some, the desire for a Palestinian state for others.
The 1987 intifada exploded with demonstrations, throwing of stones and bottles, burning of tyres and blocking of roads. The Palestinians realized that rioting and civil action, linked to the deliberate non-use of arms, would make it difficult for Israel to respond with their full military might without losing public support both at home and internationally. The Palestinians knew that if they resorted to guns it would give the Israelis the pretext to use overwhelming force to stop the intifada in its tracks. They also recognized the need to spread the uprising to Jerusalem where the international press would broadcast what was occurring to the rest of the world and the Jerusalem riots of December 1987 were on a scale not seen since the six-day war in 1967. Hamas, unlike the other Palestinian groups, were prepared to use arms and explosives from the outset. They escalated the violence and would go on to commit appalling acts of terrorism which would often halt and reverse the peace process that followed the end of the 1987 intifada.[5]
The Palestinians resorted to the greater use of arms in the Al-Aqsa intifada instead of the characteristic rock-throwing melees of the 1987 intifada. There was also a dramatic increase in violence due to the spiral of attack/retaliation and a massive increase in suicide bombing. This time the violence took place on the edges of urban areas and the Palestinians struck at Jewish settlers as well as security forces. There was also a greater involvement of Israeli Arabs who rioted throughout Galilee (northern Israel), and in the mixed towns in Israel. There were also armed attacks in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem; thus bringing the Al-Aqsa intifada to the very heart of Israel. Also, the Islamists and ‘young guard’ were playing a much larger part and were more willing to use increasing levels of violence, whatever the cost, in the belief that armed struggle was the only way to achieve their objectives. The Al-Aqsa intifada soon became the fully fledged guerilla war, brutally focusing on the slaughter of civilians, which continues today.[6]
There were successes as a result of the Palestinian military strategies; the Palestinian issue was internationalized; the Israeli Arabs showed themselves, at last, to be more Palestinian than Israeli; the Jewish population became divided – some willing to trade land for peace although others becoming even more extremist; the PLO was recognized by Israel after twenty nine years of refusal; and a Palestinian Authority established. The strategies had also succeeded in getting the Israelis to various negotiating tables but the Palestinians were simply unable, or unwilling, to translate any short-term advantage into the realization of their longer term political objectives.
The political and territorial requirements for a durable peace remain unaltered, the gap between the two sides unbridgeable and, until there is a willingness of the Palestinians to recognize the right of Israel to exist, a long-term settlement will remain illusive.
....any comments from "real" Middle East scholars would be welcome, or anyone else for that matter!
The Palestinian military strategies in the first (1987) intifada failed because of an inability to take full advantage of a popular uprising that had gained wide-spread international support. In the second (Al-Aqsa) intifada, the primary cause of failure has been an over-emphasis on the use of violence. This has split Palestinian society, making it impossible to maintain the strategic focus required for success. Without the military means required to achieve their political objectives by force, or a willingness to adjust them, there seems little chance of any military strategy succeeding. Furthermore, the in-fighting that has characterized Palestinian politics remains the dominant factor today as the Palestinians face the spectre of civil war.
The 1987 intifada surprised both the Israelis and Palestinians. The cause was essentially a Palestinian frustration with their lot: a quasi-occupation under which normal political, social and economic life was stifled and from which there appeared to be no escape. The intifada started as a popular uprising without specific political objectives and therefore no pre-defined military strategy. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), however, which was worried about being marginalized, quickly joined the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, the Communist Party and Islamic Jihad to form the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), in an attempt to coordinate and benefit from the intifada.[1] The UNLU mantra was, ‘down with occupation; long live Palestine as a free and Arab country’.[2] The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) joined the intifada late but was soon taking a leading role. They maintained that there could be no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad and urged Palestinians to rise up and expel the Jews from Palestine.[3]
Although sparked off by Sharon visiting Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif, the Al-Aqsa intifada resulted from the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit. Camp David was to have been the final peace deal, ending decades of Palestinian-Jewish strife but, with the Jerusalem and refugee issues unresolved, the Summit collapsed. The failure added to the frustration of Palestinians with a peace process which had not gained them an independent state and had not improved the reality of their lives in the occupied territories. The loss of confidence in the ability of the peace process to deliver a permanent agreement on acceptable terms had a dramatic impact on the level of Palestinian support for violence against Israelis, including suicide bombings against civilians. According to the PLO, the political objectives of the Al-Aqsa intifada were; the return of refugees; the ending of occupation; the gaining of independence and sovereignty; and establishment of Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem. In reality, the Palestinians had not altered their basic position they had held since 1993; a two-state solution, with a non-militarized Palestinian state along 1967 borders and a pragmatic solution to the refugee problem.[4] Palestinian political objectives, whilst fragmented, were not vastly different between the two intifadas i.e. the destruction of Israel for some, the desire for a Palestinian state for others.
The 1987 intifada exploded with demonstrations, throwing of stones and bottles, burning of tyres and blocking of roads. The Palestinians realized that rioting and civil action, linked to the deliberate non-use of arms, would make it difficult for Israel to respond with their full military might without losing public support both at home and internationally. The Palestinians knew that if they resorted to guns it would give the Israelis the pretext to use overwhelming force to stop the intifada in its tracks. They also recognized the need to spread the uprising to Jerusalem where the international press would broadcast what was occurring to the rest of the world and the Jerusalem riots of December 1987 were on a scale not seen since the six-day war in 1967. Hamas, unlike the other Palestinian groups, were prepared to use arms and explosives from the outset. They escalated the violence and would go on to commit appalling acts of terrorism which would often halt and reverse the peace process that followed the end of the 1987 intifada.[5]
The Palestinians resorted to the greater use of arms in the Al-Aqsa intifada instead of the characteristic rock-throwing melees of the 1987 intifada. There was also a dramatic increase in violence due to the spiral of attack/retaliation and a massive increase in suicide bombing. This time the violence took place on the edges of urban areas and the Palestinians struck at Jewish settlers as well as security forces. There was also a greater involvement of Israeli Arabs who rioted throughout Galilee (northern Israel), and in the mixed towns in Israel. There were also armed attacks in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem; thus bringing the Al-Aqsa intifada to the very heart of Israel. Also, the Islamists and ‘young guard’ were playing a much larger part and were more willing to use increasing levels of violence, whatever the cost, in the belief that armed struggle was the only way to achieve their objectives. The Al-Aqsa intifada soon became the fully fledged guerilla war, brutally focusing on the slaughter of civilians, which continues today.[6]
There were successes as a result of the Palestinian military strategies; the Palestinian issue was internationalized; the Israeli Arabs showed themselves, at last, to be more Palestinian than Israeli; the Jewish population became divided – some willing to trade land for peace although others becoming even more extremist; the PLO was recognized by Israel after twenty nine years of refusal; and a Palestinian Authority established. The strategies had also succeeded in getting the Israelis to various negotiating tables but the Palestinians were simply unable, or unwilling, to translate any short-term advantage into the realization of their longer term political objectives.
The political and territorial requirements for a durable peace remain unaltered, the gap between the two sides unbridgeable and, until there is a willingness of the Palestinians to recognize the right of Israel to exist, a long-term settlement will remain illusive.
....any comments from "real" Middle East scholars would be welcome, or anyone else for that matter!
posted by Pip Leighton | 6:59 AM
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