Fukuyama's "End of History"
Well I’m off the Canada this weekend for few days to see whether the U.S. will give me a long term visa – I know, why do I have to leave the U.S. to get this sorted out? It’s a long story but here’s a few thoughts on Fukuyama and his “End of History” essay, before I go, in an attempt to address some of the questions posed in Module 3.1 I’m not sure how much internet access I will have in the next week and so I may be slow to join the discussions later next week – we’ll see. Anyway, to the specific questions posed relating to Fukuyama's "End of History"….
What basic assumptions are made about the nature of international politics? A short answer is that Fukuyama suggested that “politics” would be replaced by “economics” in what he called “common marketization” and that markets are far more likely to thrive in capitalist democratic societies. There would therefore be a move away from international politics based on ideology because the ideological argument in the world had been won i.e. that democracy (and specifically liberal democracy and maybe, if one is unkind, the American version) was the way and the only way in the future.
What is the empirical basis for the arguments put forward? Fukuyama seems to have based his argument primarily on the empirical evidence that there was not one “Free” nation (Free = democracy with universal suffrage) in 1900 there are now over 120. Therefore his logic is that there is overwhelming empirical evidence that democracy will become even more prevalent in the future until it is the only form of government in the world.
How convincing is the argument? I personally find his arguments quite compelling but I probably haven’t read widely enough yet. The empirical evidence speaks for itself as does his claim that as a result of the defeat of fascism and communism there will be fewer inter state (developed state that is) conflicts and that in turn will lead to a more peaceful world (at least in the developed part of it) as democracies don’t tend to fight each other. What he doesn’t seem to give much thought to has been others competing factors i.e. religion, culture, nationalism, etc. Indeed, he seems to discounts these fairly glibly and Huntington for example argues that there are likely to be greater conflicts between “civilizations” in the future.
Does Fukuyama anticipate challenges to his argument? I’m no sure that he did and certainly not in the quantity and quality of the challenges i.e. Derrida saying that never before in absolute terms have there been so many subjugated, starved or exterminated people in the world than today or die-hard Marxists such as Anderson who agree that whilst democracy is the future, communism does itself have democracy as an integral part of it (albeit direct democracy) and then there’s Huntington (already mentioned above) as well as many more.
What implications might the article have for policy-making in the post-Cold War world? I suppose that this is the “so what?” question. The question assumes a Western orientation, which by Fukuyama’s thesis seems to be the only valid orientation anyway. From a U.S. perspective I suppose it meant that the main battle had been won and the rest would, in time, inevitably follow. That it validates a policy of the exportation of democracy and that maybe the quicker the better. Maybe, Fukuyama created a complacency in policy-making. Of course, from a non-Western and non- democratic perspective his article might have provoked an angry reaction but maybe, as according to Fukuyama, any non-Western opinion doesn’t matter in the big scheme of things i.e. that of “crackpot Messiahs” or “people in Albania or Burkina Faso”, etc. Maybe it is just this sort of comment that has also led, in part, to a growing anti-Americanism in the world. It is therefore maybe the reaction to the article rather than the article itself that should have the greater implications in policy-making i.e. a tempering and less confrontational style.
The end – at least for the moment but please feel free to comment here or enter on your own learning journals in your blogs.
Pip
What basic assumptions are made about the nature of international politics? A short answer is that Fukuyama suggested that “politics” would be replaced by “economics” in what he called “common marketization” and that markets are far more likely to thrive in capitalist democratic societies. There would therefore be a move away from international politics based on ideology because the ideological argument in the world had been won i.e. that democracy (and specifically liberal democracy and maybe, if one is unkind, the American version) was the way and the only way in the future.
What is the empirical basis for the arguments put forward? Fukuyama seems to have based his argument primarily on the empirical evidence that there was not one “Free” nation (Free = democracy with universal suffrage) in 1900 there are now over 120. Therefore his logic is that there is overwhelming empirical evidence that democracy will become even more prevalent in the future until it is the only form of government in the world.
How convincing is the argument? I personally find his arguments quite compelling but I probably haven’t read widely enough yet. The empirical evidence speaks for itself as does his claim that as a result of the defeat of fascism and communism there will be fewer inter state (developed state that is) conflicts and that in turn will lead to a more peaceful world (at least in the developed part of it) as democracies don’t tend to fight each other. What he doesn’t seem to give much thought to has been others competing factors i.e. religion, culture, nationalism, etc. Indeed, he seems to discounts these fairly glibly and Huntington for example argues that there are likely to be greater conflicts between “civilizations” in the future.
Does Fukuyama anticipate challenges to his argument? I’m no sure that he did and certainly not in the quantity and quality of the challenges i.e. Derrida saying that never before in absolute terms have there been so many subjugated, starved or exterminated people in the world than today or die-hard Marxists such as Anderson who agree that whilst democracy is the future, communism does itself have democracy as an integral part of it (albeit direct democracy) and then there’s Huntington (already mentioned above) as well as many more.
What implications might the article have for policy-making in the post-Cold War world? I suppose that this is the “so what?” question. The question assumes a Western orientation, which by Fukuyama’s thesis seems to be the only valid orientation anyway. From a U.S. perspective I suppose it meant that the main battle had been won and the rest would, in time, inevitably follow. That it validates a policy of the exportation of democracy and that maybe the quicker the better. Maybe, Fukuyama created a complacency in policy-making. Of course, from a non-Western and non- democratic perspective his article might have provoked an angry reaction but maybe, as according to Fukuyama, any non-Western opinion doesn’t matter in the big scheme of things i.e. that of “crackpot Messiahs” or “people in Albania or Burkina Faso”, etc. Maybe it is just this sort of comment that has also led, in part, to a growing anti-Americanism in the world. It is therefore maybe the reaction to the article rather than the article itself that should have the greater implications in policy-making i.e. a tempering and less confrontational style.
The end – at least for the moment but please feel free to comment here or enter on your own learning journals in your blogs.
Pip
posted by Pip Leighton | 12:16 PM
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