"Perceptions, Perceptions, Perceptions"
As Sam outlined, NSC 68 provided the blueprint for how the US was proposing to fight the future Cold War. I do, however, think that saying that it was written, “out of fear and paranoia” is overstating the point a little. I think that NSC 68 was written in recognition of the need to articulate policy. It was the first real formal statement of US National Strategy and it concluded that “all means other than all-out-war would be used to induce change in the Soviet system and that the US would no longer make any settlement or compromise with USSR or China” (Lefeber). It marked a shift in emphasis from acknowledgement of a traditional “balance of power” to one which “inescapably confronts the slave society with the free” (Lefeber). NSC 68 therefore globalized the Truman Doctrine with the US unilaterally assuming the defence of the non-communist world”.
I do not agree with Owen’s statement that “the implementation of NSC 68 was inevitable without the Korean War” but nor do I agree with David’s statement that, “without the Korean War, I do not believe that NSC 68 would have been implemented”. If they had amended their statements a little and said something like; “the Korean War directly led to the implementation of NSC 68”, then I would have agreed with this. My point is, that if it had not been the Korea War, then there were any number of other crises around the corner which would probably have had the same impact i.e. provided the catalyst that NSC 68 needed for it to be implemented. I do agree with David about the “massive changes” that the NSC 68 led to as he lists in his final paragraph. He might, however, have added, “US assistance given to the French in Indochina”. Indeed, this could have been an example of an alternative crisis vide my comment above.
The Korean War brought Asia, and most significantly China, into the Cold War and placed China firmly in the Soviet camp. Mao’s, “leaning to one side or the other”, becoming almost total dependence on USSR. The US led trade embargo on China resulted in the 9% of all Chinese trade being with USSR in 1949 rising to a staggering 70% by 1952! That said, the Korean War was also “pivotal” (Crockatt) in starting to undermine this new Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao was quick to show, “the first signs of disillusionment – resulting from Stalin’s stinginess in providing promised military assistance. He became considerably more cautious about relying on Moscow’s help and also less deferential to Moscow’s authority” (Gaddis). Much of this was lost on the US, who remained convinced that China was in full partnership with the USSR and bent on world domination. Through the Korean War, Mao demonstrated that his revolution could not be reversed by force and that China had what it took to face down a nuclear foe. The US realised that it would be unable to destroy either the USSR or China but that it did need to prevent either or both from expanding. A huge impact was therefore to ensure that in the future the Cold War would be fought by the US on the periphery but not directly between the major powers and not in areas of vital interest. “The US would not push beyond the Iron Curtain or Bamboo Curtain” but “if any communist showed his head on the free side of the line, someone – usually an American – would be there to shoot him!” (Ambrose). The irony was that the US reaction in Korea led to closer immediate ties between China and USSR which may not have otherwise occurred and even the USSR was surprised by this particular development. China felt that it had little choice but to embrace the USSR given US expansionist plans (which were never actually there) and even though it realised that this may not have been in its longer term interests. The UK had made it clear that the use of US nuclear weapons in Korea would have led to a collapse of the alliance in Europe and even possibly the even the annihilation of Europe itself. This led to not inconsiderable friction between the US and its European allies. The US did, however, re-affirm that, whilst the Cold War had moved into Asia, the US policy of Europe “first” remained albeit with Asia “a very close second”.
The impact of the Korean War and the implementation of NSC 68 on the USSR was considerable with the USSR arguably the biggest loser. Stalin’s approval of Kim’s invasion of North Korea directly led to the one thing that Stalin really feared; the rearmament of Germany. Also, the USSR would, henceforth, have to regard China as something of an equal in the communist world. “The Korean War removed any qualms about the US reaching a separate peace with Japan” (Crockatt), the provisions of which included a security pact and the granting of base rights to the US, reflecting largely bilateral interests. This impacted on the USSR, with USSR concluding that not only was its own policy in eastern Europe similarly acceptable but that the US had expansionist aims in Asia. The Korean War led to a complete reappraisal of Soviet strategy, which had “spectacularly failed to achieve its primary aim of dividing the US and European allies”. The post Korean War strategy being one of “peaceful co-existence”, i.e. continued struggle but using political means.
The Korean War confirmed US belief in the “domino theory” and this had an enormous impact on The Third World where every subsequent “war of national liberation” became a conflict within the greater “Cold War” setting. Interestingly, a similar Chinese “domino theory” had made their own involvement in Korea necessary (albeit following intense pressure and prodding from Stalin) in the face of what Mao referred to as “The US invasion of Asia”. The Korean War also had a huge bearing on the severe defeat of the Democrats in both the presidency and congress and the strong victory for Eisenhower, which led to a further hardening of an increasingly bellicose and anti-communist attitude.
Perhaps, the most important impact of NSC 68 and the Korean War on the Cold War was the realization of the importance of perceptions and how misinterpretations of messages and facts could lead to conflict. David outlines his in his penultimate paragraph albeit in terms of “miscalculation” and “misconceptions”. When Acheson said that Korea was "not an area of US vital interest" it illustrates this point. Stalin took this statement to mean that the US would not enter a conflict in Korea. Indeed, Stalin soon regretted the North Korean invasion when the US did respond and he tried to distance the USSR from the invasion and to ensure that there would be no widening of the conflict. Mao warned that China would enter the conflict if the US pressed towards the Chinese border. Indeed, Mao had been warning since the beginning of the war that China would not accept to presence of hostile troops so close to its border. The warning was not heeded and the US pushed north and China entered the war, albeit with substantial military support from the USSR. “World order”, wrote Gaddis, “and with it US security, had come to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was”. Indeed, Gaddis went further to say that it was the perceptions of a growing number of people that now mattered and not just the statesmen customarily charged with making policy i.e. mass opinion, foreign and domestic, informed/ill-informed. rational/irrational (and by whose gauge?), etc. Also, that “judgements on traditional criteria such as geography, economics, military potential now had to be balanced against considerations of image, prestige and credibility”. To my mind, the Korean War provided the catalyst (mentioned earlier) that led to the implementation of NSC 68 but, more importantly, this whole period resulted in a dawning realization that there were actually completely different perceptions of the same set of circumstances and facts relating to the Cold War all be they ever complicated and inter linked.
Pip
Afternote:
We all read the same books on this course, yet it is interesting that even we often have very different perceptions of the issues we have read about. Nick used a clearer phrase in his “Owen’s right …” response when he wrote, “different things to different audiences” when describing the Korean War. Perhaps we all have preconceived ideas? Perhaps this was the central problem in the early days of the Cold War when there was an apparent lack of real analysis of the action/reaction relationship that led to an inevitable cycle of escalation. Not quite Newton’s 3rd law of motion but rather; “to every action there is”, not “an equal”, but rather “an increased”, "and opposite reaction"! Gaddis talks about the US having a “sense of direction without destination” and of “marching forthrightly forward into unknown areas, without any clear sense of what the ultimate objective was, how long it would take to achieve it, or at what cost”. I wonder how much has really changed.
I do not agree with Owen’s statement that “the implementation of NSC 68 was inevitable without the Korean War” but nor do I agree with David’s statement that, “without the Korean War, I do not believe that NSC 68 would have been implemented”. If they had amended their statements a little and said something like; “the Korean War directly led to the implementation of NSC 68”, then I would have agreed with this. My point is, that if it had not been the Korea War, then there were any number of other crises around the corner which would probably have had the same impact i.e. provided the catalyst that NSC 68 needed for it to be implemented. I do agree with David about the “massive changes” that the NSC 68 led to as he lists in his final paragraph. He might, however, have added, “US assistance given to the French in Indochina”. Indeed, this could have been an example of an alternative crisis vide my comment above.
The Korean War brought Asia, and most significantly China, into the Cold War and placed China firmly in the Soviet camp. Mao’s, “leaning to one side or the other”, becoming almost total dependence on USSR. The US led trade embargo on China resulted in the 9% of all Chinese trade being with USSR in 1949 rising to a staggering 70% by 1952! That said, the Korean War was also “pivotal” (Crockatt) in starting to undermine this new Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao was quick to show, “the first signs of disillusionment – resulting from Stalin’s stinginess in providing promised military assistance. He became considerably more cautious about relying on Moscow’s help and also less deferential to Moscow’s authority” (Gaddis). Much of this was lost on the US, who remained convinced that China was in full partnership with the USSR and bent on world domination. Through the Korean War, Mao demonstrated that his revolution could not be reversed by force and that China had what it took to face down a nuclear foe. The US realised that it would be unable to destroy either the USSR or China but that it did need to prevent either or both from expanding. A huge impact was therefore to ensure that in the future the Cold War would be fought by the US on the periphery but not directly between the major powers and not in areas of vital interest. “The US would not push beyond the Iron Curtain or Bamboo Curtain” but “if any communist showed his head on the free side of the line, someone – usually an American – would be there to shoot him!” (Ambrose). The irony was that the US reaction in Korea led to closer immediate ties between China and USSR which may not have otherwise occurred and even the USSR was surprised by this particular development. China felt that it had little choice but to embrace the USSR given US expansionist plans (which were never actually there) and even though it realised that this may not have been in its longer term interests. The UK had made it clear that the use of US nuclear weapons in Korea would have led to a collapse of the alliance in Europe and even possibly the even the annihilation of Europe itself. This led to not inconsiderable friction between the US and its European allies. The US did, however, re-affirm that, whilst the Cold War had moved into Asia, the US policy of Europe “first” remained albeit with Asia “a very close second”.
The impact of the Korean War and the implementation of NSC 68 on the USSR was considerable with the USSR arguably the biggest loser. Stalin’s approval of Kim’s invasion of North Korea directly led to the one thing that Stalin really feared; the rearmament of Germany. Also, the USSR would, henceforth, have to regard China as something of an equal in the communist world. “The Korean War removed any qualms about the US reaching a separate peace with Japan” (Crockatt), the provisions of which included a security pact and the granting of base rights to the US, reflecting largely bilateral interests. This impacted on the USSR, with USSR concluding that not only was its own policy in eastern Europe similarly acceptable but that the US had expansionist aims in Asia. The Korean War led to a complete reappraisal of Soviet strategy, which had “spectacularly failed to achieve its primary aim of dividing the US and European allies”. The post Korean War strategy being one of “peaceful co-existence”, i.e. continued struggle but using political means.
The Korean War confirmed US belief in the “domino theory” and this had an enormous impact on The Third World where every subsequent “war of national liberation” became a conflict within the greater “Cold War” setting. Interestingly, a similar Chinese “domino theory” had made their own involvement in Korea necessary (albeit following intense pressure and prodding from Stalin) in the face of what Mao referred to as “The US invasion of Asia”. The Korean War also had a huge bearing on the severe defeat of the Democrats in both the presidency and congress and the strong victory for Eisenhower, which led to a further hardening of an increasingly bellicose and anti-communist attitude.
Perhaps, the most important impact of NSC 68 and the Korean War on the Cold War was the realization of the importance of perceptions and how misinterpretations of messages and facts could lead to conflict. David outlines his in his penultimate paragraph albeit in terms of “miscalculation” and “misconceptions”. When Acheson said that Korea was "not an area of US vital interest" it illustrates this point. Stalin took this statement to mean that the US would not enter a conflict in Korea. Indeed, Stalin soon regretted the North Korean invasion when the US did respond and he tried to distance the USSR from the invasion and to ensure that there would be no widening of the conflict. Mao warned that China would enter the conflict if the US pressed towards the Chinese border. Indeed, Mao had been warning since the beginning of the war that China would not accept to presence of hostile troops so close to its border. The warning was not heeded and the US pushed north and China entered the war, albeit with substantial military support from the USSR. “World order”, wrote Gaddis, “and with it US security, had come to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was”. Indeed, Gaddis went further to say that it was the perceptions of a growing number of people that now mattered and not just the statesmen customarily charged with making policy i.e. mass opinion, foreign and domestic, informed/ill-informed. rational/irrational (and by whose gauge?), etc. Also, that “judgements on traditional criteria such as geography, economics, military potential now had to be balanced against considerations of image, prestige and credibility”. To my mind, the Korean War provided the catalyst (mentioned earlier) that led to the implementation of NSC 68 but, more importantly, this whole period resulted in a dawning realization that there were actually completely different perceptions of the same set of circumstances and facts relating to the Cold War all be they ever complicated and inter linked.
Pip
Afternote:
We all read the same books on this course, yet it is interesting that even we often have very different perceptions of the issues we have read about. Nick used a clearer phrase in his “Owen’s right …” response when he wrote, “different things to different audiences” when describing the Korean War. Perhaps we all have preconceived ideas? Perhaps this was the central problem in the early days of the Cold War when there was an apparent lack of real analysis of the action/reaction relationship that led to an inevitable cycle of escalation. Not quite Newton’s 3rd law of motion but rather; “to every action there is”, not “an equal”, but rather “an increased”, "and opposite reaction"! Gaddis talks about the US having a “sense of direction without destination” and of “marching forthrightly forward into unknown areas, without any clear sense of what the ultimate objective was, how long it would take to achieve it, or at what cost”. I wonder how much has really changed.
posted by Pip Leighton | 7:00 AM
1 Comments:
Hi Pip, I was struck by what you said in your postscript about perceptions and how each of you looking at the same issue, using the same texts, has come to subtly different (occasionally widely different) conclusions. On the one hand, there's a truism here: we all see the world from our own individual perspective and everything is necessarily coloured by our mental filters or preconceptions. Some months ago I was watching a pop-psychology programme (I forget what it was, probably something on BBC) which was looking at how the brain filters processes visual information. Some test subjects were asked to watch a man bouncing a ball and to count how many times the ball bounced. While this was happening another man in a gorilla suit walked slowly and directly across the field of view. The overwhelming majority of test subjects completely failed to notice the gorilla in the frame despite it being in plain view. When shown the tape afterwards they couldn't believe they had missed it. Basically, their brains occupied with the task of counting bounces completely filtered this otherwise remarkable thing (one doesn't see a lot of gorillas around) out of the picture. They just didn't see it.
Why does this matter? Well, it illustrated to me, albeit somewhat crudely, somethings which I think are important to keep in mind as scholars.
Firstly, while we may (indeed must) strive for objectivity we can never fully achieve it. We are human beings studying the actions of other human beings rather than electrons or lab rats and as a result we cannot possibly completely distance ourselves from the thing which we are observing. We each process information about the world through filters (biases, prejudices and preconceptions, call them what you will) which are unique to ourselves. The trick, in my opinion, is not so much to remove those filters as it is to be aware that they exist and make them explicit in our arguments (especially written ones) so that readers can effectively evaluate it. We do this in real life: if you've ever said 'I disagree with what you say but I see where you're coming from', that is what I mean. Put in more academic terms it means that an academic argument makes explicit all of its logical premises. Personally, I think this requires a number of things: introspection, self-honesty and intellectual modesty (a quality which often goes unrecognized).
Secondly, it illustrates what I think is one of the ineffable qualities of genius. Most of us are plodders. Give us a task: count how many times this ball bounces or answer the question 'was the Cold War inevitable'. And we'll perform it generally reliably. Only a few of us can do it reliably while taking notice of the gorilla too. Call it the ability to 'think outside the box', to use a slightly tired expression. I'm not sure what exactly this quality derives from since I am only occasionally capable of it myself. I think, however, it has got to be a certain mental playfulness which tends a person to try relating seemingly unrelated concepts and a willingness to be called barking mad.
I too liked Gaddis' talk of 'sense of direction withuot destination', not because I thuoght it was right but because it got me thinking that you could make a case for the reverse: 'the US has a sense of destination with no idea how to get there.' There's an argument concerning the use of force in American foreign policy that says there are two camps: the force 'conservers' who argue that one should use force only in pursuit of vital national interests; and the force 'proponents' who see the use of force as one of a range of tools available to achieve one's foreign policy aims. It struck me that you could say of the latter that they had a destination in mind but were a little 'fuzzy' on the means of getting there and of the former that they had an appreciation of the means but not the destination.
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